MARCEL MBAMALU
Washington’s recent military action against Venezuela has shocked the world and raised a stark question: if rising insecurity and drug cartels justify extreme measures, why Venezuela and not Mexico or Colombia? At first glance, it appears inconsistent. But this is not merely a contradiction. It reflects a calculated exercise of power shaped by geopolitics, economic interests, and strategic consequences.
On 3 January, United States forces launched a large-scale operation in Venezuela that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.
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Mr Maduro was flown to New York, where he was to appear in federal court on drug and weapons charges.
President Donald Trump described the capture as success, and said the United States would “run” Venezuela temporarily during a transition and help restore production in its vast oil industry.
So, after months of sanctions and naval interceptions, the US weighed strategic gains from capturing Maduro against legal and economic risks?
With the United Nations Security Council set to meet and Mr Maduro facing court in New York, the world is asking: how far will the United States go in asserting its power, and what does this mean for Latin America’s future?
The Venezuela crisis did not begin today. The two nations have faced a tense standoff for over a decade, with successive US administrations accusing Nicolás Maduro of authoritarianism, human rights violations, and undermining democracy. US pressure began around 2017–2018, escalating through 2021, but decisive action came only after Trump’s reelection.
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Evidence showed that Caracas resisted sanctions and strengthened ties with China, Russia, and Iran, widening the strategic divide.
For this, Washington framed Venezuela as an illegitimate, hostile state, citing alleged state-level drug trafficking and harbouring of foreign adversaries.
Maduro has held power since March 2013, after Hugo Chávez’s death. Venezuela’s constitution sets a six-year term, while a 2009 amendment removed re-election limits, allowing him to remain in power through contested elections.
Over more than a decade, he has presided over economic collapse, hyperinflation, and mass emigration. Therefore, can a government so long in power truly claim to represent a content citizenry?
So Trump is not the only US president to allege state-level criminality against Venezuela
Previous administrations before and after Trump’s first tenure, had observed the same patterns, but none took such decisive action.
US secretary of State Marco Rubio recently framed the stakes sharply, warning that Venezuela must not become an operational hub for China, Russia, Iran, or allied intelligence networks, bringing key aspects of the issue into the public eye.
This reasoning shifted the narrative from crime to national security, providing Washington’s leadership with justification for decisive intervention.
Oil, Influence, and the Real Red Line
Venezuela holds an estimated 304 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the largest in the world. For decades, control of this resource has been central to Caracas’s economy and foreign engagement.
In the 2000s and early 2010s, stateowned Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) dominated output, selling largely to the United States. As production declined and sanctions tightened after 2014, Venezuela turned to foreign partners to sustain its energy sector.
China’s entry began in earnest in the late 2000s under President Hugo Chávez, when Caracas secured billions in loans in exchange for future oil deliveries. By the mid2010s, Chinese state firms and banks had become among Venezuela’s largest creditors and buyers of its crude. Russian involvement expanded in the 2010s as well, with Rosneft and other entities taking stakes in refineries, joint ventures, and financing arrangements.
Iran’s engagement, particularly after 2018 sanctions, included shipments of heavy crude and technical support for refineries.
Perhaps, for Washington, the concern is not access to Venezuelan crude alone; it is who controls its infrastructure and market pathways. This is because US officials argued that Chinese and Russian firms operating in Venezuelan refineries, export terminals and logistics networks could give Beijing and Moscow strategic leverage in the Western Hemisphere.
This calculus framed Venezuela not simply as an economic opportunity for foreign investors but as a potential platform for adversaries. In this view, control of energy assets equates to geopolitical influence. Limiting the reach of China, Russia and Iran in Venezuela became part of a broader effort to contain rival powers, a red line in the contest for global strategic positioning.
This now helps explain why the US might take extraordinary measures, even at the edge of international law to take control.
International Law and the Problem of Precedent
Under international law, no state has the automatic right to arrest or remove a sitting foreign president. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Sovereignty and non-interference are core principles. Even serious crimes do not automatically permit unilateral military action.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has repeatedly upheld this, including in cases like Nicaragua v. United States (1986), where the ICJ ruled that the United States had violated international law by supporting armed opposition against the Nicaraguan government.
By implication, criminal allegations alone do not justify invasion or regime change. Historical instances reinforce this. The international community blocked attempts to forcibly remove Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir despite his indictment by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity, and the world largely refrained from military action against Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire despite corruption and human rights abuses.
These cases show that even powerful nations are constrained by law, norms, and potential global backlash.
This is because normalising unilateral action carries profound risks. It sets a precedent that other powers could exploit, weakening the legal frameworks designed to prevent aggressive interventions.
Why has the US not attacked Mexico or Columbia
If Washington’s justification for Venezuela, state-level criminality as a license for direct action, were accepted, similar reasoning could be applied anywhere, including Mexico, Colombia, or even the United States itself.
Yet the United States treats these cases differently. Mexico and Colombia, despite serious security challenges including drug cartels, remain sovereign partners.
That is why experts argue that the distinction is strategic. Venezuela is framed as a rogue, isolated state, whereas Mexico and Colombia are indispensable neighbours whose stability cannot be sacrificed.
Mexico’s democratic institutions, deep economic ties, and treaty obligations mean military action would collapse supply chains, trigger mass migration, and destabilise border states.
Colombia shows that decades of cooperative counter-narcotics efforts, not invasion, are required to manage criminal networks. Drug cartels, embedded in society, are not conventional targets; leader-focused strategies often increase violence.
Analysts also note that geography and interdependence act as restraint, maybe even the White House recognises intervention could import instability into the US. Yet such decisive operations, like Venezuela’s capture, inevitably carry consequences.
Global Reaction and Geopolitical Consequences
China, Russia, and other Venezuelan allies have condemned the US operation as a violation of sovereignty and international law, but it remains unclear whether they can stop Washington from pursuing Maduro.
Regional actors expressed unease, noting that the episode erodes norms of non-interference essential for global stability. Analysts suggest the operation may harden adversaries’ resolve, giving them a rationale to expand influence in energy markets, security alliances, and broader US–China and US–Russia competition.
Worthy to note is that criticism has emerged across US political lines. Local leaders, including the mayor of New York, questioned the legality and prudence of the operation, highlighting why Democrats have historically resisted such measures.
Congressional voices raised concerns over executive authority and warned of long-term entanglement. Others note that this dissent reflects broader unease about unilateral interventions, signaling that US unity behind the use of force is no longer assured, even when framed as protecting national security and hemispheric interests.
The Uncomfortable Truth
Yet, beyond sovereignty and law lies a deeper reality. The United States itself is entwined in the forces driving Venezuela’s crises because US demand for drugs, the flow of firearms into the region, and financial systems that launder illicit proceeds are structural drivers of the problems.
If one were to follow the logic of unilateral capture, who should be held accountable in Washington?
Externalising blame onto a single leader ignores these underlying forces. Market-driven, transnational challenges cannot be solved by force alone.
Military interventions, however decisive, may remove a figurehead but cannot erase the networks, demand, and systemic vulnerabilities that sustain the crisis.
In this context, the Maduro operation is a dramatic assertion of power, yet it is no substitute for addressing the deeper structural problems that underpin instability in Venezuela and across the hemisphere.
