Amanze Chinonye
Ghana’s gold-buying programme has become the subject of an increasingly heated political and economic debate, with two figures at the centre of the controversy: a reported US$1.7 billion loss and a GH¢5.44 billion surplus.
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Minority Leader Alexander Afenyo-Markin has accused the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) and the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP) of losing about US$1.7 billion, equivalent to roughly GH¢22 billion, in 2025.
GoldBod Chief Executive Officer Sammy Gyamfi has rejected the claim, pointing to the board’s audited financial statements, which recorded an overall surplus of about GH¢5.44 billion and an operational surplus of roughly GH¢900 million.
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At first glance, the figures appear contradictory. They are not. They relate to different entities and accounting levels within Ghana’s gold-purchasing framework.
The GH¢5.44 billion figure comes from GoldBod’s audited accounts, while the US$1.7 billion figure comes from the International Monetary Fund’s assessment of losses incurred by the Bank of Ghana under the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme.
Afenyo-Markin has nevertheless maintained his criticism of GoldBod and its management.
“If you give Sammy Gyamfi and his people the Bible, the Quran, or even Schnapps to swear on the very matter we are holding them accountable for, they cannot do it,” he said in a recent interview.
He said he was not concerned about criticism directed at him by Sammy Gyamfi or others defending the programme.
“I am not worried about the insults he throws at me, nor am I bothered by the people he has allegedly hired to stay in the media and insult me, using all manner of unprintable words against me,” Afenyo-Markin said. “I am not worried at all. Facts do not need insults to defend them.”
Beneath the political exchanges, however, lies a more consequential question: What did GoldBod’s core operations actually deliver in 2025, and what did Ghana pay for the wider gold-for-reserves strategy?
GoldBod’s surplus needs context
GoldBod’s audited financial statements for 2025 show that the institution did not record a loss. It reported an overall surplus of GH¢5.44 billion.
That figure, however, should not be interpreted as GH¢5.44 billion in commercial profit.
About GH¢4.55 billion represented an unutilised government capital subvention intended to support GoldBod’s gold-purchasing operations. The funding strengthened the board’s financial position but was not revenue generated from its core trading activities.
Once that government-funded component is separated, GoldBod’s underlying operating performance becomes clearer.
The board recorded an operational surplus of about GH¢900 million. GoldBod’s accounts also present an ex-subvention surplus of about GH¢896 million, accounting for the slight difference between the two figures.
GoldBod recorded approximately GH¢970.8 million in non-tax revenue, reflecting income from its operations and services.
The figures indicate that GoldBod was operationally profitable in its first year. But they also show why its headline GH¢5.44 billion surplus should not be treated as conventional commercial profit.
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What lies behind the US$1.7 billion loss?
The source of the larger loss figure lies in the Bank of Ghana’s implementation of the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme.
An IMF assessment found that losses under the DGPP rose from about US$400 million in 2024 to more than US$1.7 billion in 2025, equivalent to about 1.5% of Ghana’s GDP.
The IMF’s figure therefore refers to the wider programme rather than a loss recorded by GoldBod itself.
During 2025, GoldBod operated as a fee-earning buying agent for the Bank of Ghana’s DGPP. It received fees for its role, while the broader trading and valuation risks remained with the central bank.
The IMF identified several factors behind the losses, including service and assay fees paid to GoldBod, discounts on gold sold to off-takers and, most significantly, exchange-rate differences between the rate used to purchase the gold and the reference rate used by the Bank of Ghana for accounting purposes.
It would therefore be inaccurate to state simply that GoldBod lost US$1.7 billion.
A more accurate description is that the Bank of Ghana’s Domestic Gold Purchase Programme incurred more than US$1.7 billion in losses in 2025, while GoldBod served as a paid buying agent under the programme.
What the Bank of Ghana’s accounts say
The Bank of Ghana’s financial statements provide another important part of the picture.
According to GoldBod’s analysis of the central bank’s audited accounts, there was a GH¢9.05 billion net loss on gold deals under the G4R and G4O programmes in 2025, compared with GH¢5.66 billion in 2024.
Approximately GH¢8.85 billion of the 2025 loss related to G4R, the programme under which GoldBod acted as the buying agent for artisanal and small-scale mining gold.
The figures establish that Ghana’s gold-for-reserves strategy carried significant financial costs, even though those costs did not appear as a GH¢22 billion loss in GoldBod’s own accounts.
The GH¢9.05 billion figure, however, should not be treated as the Bank of Ghana’s entire gold-sector result. GoldBod’s analysis also notes that the central bank recorded substantial gains from the sale of refined and bullion gold.
The broader picture is therefore more complex than a single loss figure.
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Gold exports and the foreign-exchange objective
The programme’s financial cost must also be considered alongside its policy objectives.
The DGPP was designed to formalise Ghana’s artisanal and small-scale gold sector, increase foreign-exchange inflows and strengthen international reserves.
GoldBod says it purchased, aggregated and exported about 104 tonnes of artisanal and small-scale mining gold in 2025, generating more than US$10.8 billion in export value.
The volume was significant, particularly because GoldBod became operational in 2025.
Ghana’s wider gold-export sector generated substantially more during the year, so national gold-export earnings should not be attributed entirely to GoldBod.
The programme nevertheless helped channel substantial foreign exchange into the formal financial system and supported reserve accumulation.
That was the principal economic rationale for the strategy: using Ghana’s gold resources to strengthen its external position at a time when foreign-exchange liquidity and reserve accumulation were critical policy priorities.
The real test: What did Ghana pay for the strategy?
The political debate becomes less useful when reduced to competing claims of “profit” and “loss”.
The more important question is whether the economic benefits of the gold-for-reserves strategy justified the financial costs incurred by the state.
GoldBod’s 2025 accounts show an institution that generated roughly GH¢900 million in operational surplus and about GH¢970.8 million in non-tax revenue. It also handled more than 100 tonnes of ASM gold, contributing to a substantial increase in formal gold exports and foreign-exchange mobilisation.
At the same time, the IMF found that the wider DGPP generated more than US$1.7 billion in losses for the Bank of Ghana in 2025.
These figures should not be presented as competing evidence about whether GoldBod itself made money. They answer different questions.
GoldBod’s audited accounts show how the institution performed financially. The IMF and Bank of Ghana figures show the cost of the wider domestic gold-purchasing and gold-for-reserves strategy.
That distinction is essential for public accountability.
GoldBod’s surplus does not eliminate the costs incurred under the wider programme. Conversely, those costs cannot simply be described as a loss recorded by GoldBod.
The real test is whether Ghana can preserve the programme’s benefits while reducing its financial burden.
GoldBod’s first year presents a mixed but measurable picture. Its audited accounts show no corporate loss and an operational surplus of about GH¢900 million, while the IMF estimates that the wider programme generated more than US$1.7 billion in losses for the Bank of Ghana.
The two figures are not mutually exclusive.
The more important question for Ghana now is whether GoldBod can build on its ability to formalise gold purchases and mobilise foreign exchange while ensuring that the costs of the programme do not continue to weigh heavily on the central bank and, ultimately, the public balance sheet.
That will be the real test of whether Ghana’s gold strategy can deliver sustainable value beyond the competing political claims over a GH¢5.44 billion surplus and a US$1.7 billion loss.
Amanze Chinonye is a Staff Correspondent at Prime Business Africa, a rising star in the literary world, weaving captivating stories that transport readers to the vibrant landscapes of Nigeria and the rest of Africa. With a unique voice that blends with the newspaper's tradition and style, Chinonye's writing is a masterful exploration of the human condition, delving into themes of identity, culture, and social justice. Through her words, Chinonye paints vivid portraits of everyday African life, from the bustling markets of Nigeria's Lagos to the quiet villages of South Africa's countryside . With a keen eye for detail and a deep understanding of the complexities of Nigerian society, Chinonye's writing is both a testament to the country's rich cultural heritage and a powerful call to action for a brighter future. As a writer, Chinonye is a true storyteller, using her dexterity to educate, inspire, and uplift readers around the world.
